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Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
Legal and Privacy Implications of
'Spy In The Sky' Satellites
Ray Purdy*
The recent $80 million film from Hollywood, Enemy of the State,
shows Government spy satellites tracking individuals without their
knowledge. Whilst the repressive use of such technology was predicted
exactly fifty years ago in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, it seems that
these sinister predictions of 'big brother' watching over us are in part now
coming true. Although satellites tracking individuals' movements might still
be fictional, they are currently used in the UK to monitor such things as
agriculture, the environment and fishing. The new generation of satellites
with improved resolution imagery can now detect such things as what crops
are being grown on private land. There has already been one prosecution in
the UK after satellite checks revealed that a farmer had made fraudulent aid
claims. 1 The satellite data was used to warn the authorities that there was a
discrepancy, and direct evidence based on a visual ground inspection was
used as the evidential basis for the successful prosecution.
If the technology continues to advance at such a rate the possibilities of
government surveillance in the new millennium are endless. It seems that the
unregulated use of these spy satellites raises emerging legal and ethical issues
concerning rights of privacy. However, there has been nothing written in
traditional legal texts and journals in the United Kingdom on privacy in the
context of satellites. This article will attempt to identify and analyse where
the law might come into play if a party objects to satellites taking intrusive
pictures of his land. The traditional British approach to privacy has usually
This article is dreived from a European Commission sponsored research project - APERTURE
(ENV 4-C797-437) (Satellite Imagery in Legal Proceedings).
Prosecution by MAFF at Cullompton Magistrates Court - 18 November 1997 - see
http//www.maffgov.ukiinf/newsrel/1998/980508b.htm/
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centred on land-based issues so particular emphasis will be placed on the use
of satellite imagery in the environmental field.
Whilst the issue of privacy in relation to security cameras has been the
subject of much discussion in recent years,2 there has been little debate in the
United Kingdom concerning the civil liberty implications of satellite
monitoring. There was a written question in Parliament nearly two years ago
on the implications of satellites in relation to personal privacy, where the
Government commented that although they'.. .do not believe these satellites
should pose any threat to personal privacy, ... the British National Space
Centre will be keeping these issues under revieW'3 There has as yet been no
reported feedback from the British National Space Centre' As mentioned
earlier, regulatory authorities in Britain have been using satellites to monitor
fraudulent agricultural claims and as yet no party has objected that the
satellites have infringed their privacy. This use of satellite monitoring has
been done in accordance with European law, which currently gives Member
States the option of using remote sensing or aerial photography to monitor
claims for aid. s It seems that any national challenge on the context of the
validity of these checks and privacy-related issues would be referred to the
European Courts. However, satellites have been used in the United Kingdom
for many other activities which are not expressly authorised by European
legislation. These have included environmental management projects such
as flood plain mapping, coastal zone management and monitoring landfill
sites. Interviews with key regulatory officials concerned with the protection
of the environment indicated that the question of satellite imagery breaching
any privacy laws had not been considered to date. 6 This article will therefore
examine the possibility of whether an individual could argue that evidence
collected against him by a satellite has infringed his rights of privacy.
House of Lords Select Conunittee on Science and Technology (1998) Digital Images as Evidence,
5th Rep0l1, HL Paper 64.
Hansard Written Answers" 12 March 1997, Col WA 27.
Personal Communication, British National Space Centre (1999).
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3508/92 and Conunission Regulation No 3887/92.
Personal Communication, Legal Group, Environment Agency.
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There has been no general constitutional or legislative right to privacy
in the United Kingdom which may be invoked where it is claimed that
intrusive surveillance techniques are being used without the consent of the
individual. The courts themselves have also been reluctant to develop rights
of privacy, and although the United Kingdom has long been a party to the
European Convention on Human Rights, those rights have not been formally
incorporated into national law. This position is about to change, and the new
Human Rights Act 1998 will introduce such rights into national law within
the next two years. It is impossible to predict the impact that these new
principles will have on litigation, though it is clear they could be significant -
for example, all public authorities will have a general duty to comply with
such principles in carrying out their general functions unless national
legislation states otherwise. Similarly, parliamentary procedures will be
introduced to ensure that national legislation complies with such principles,
although the courts will not have the power to strike down laws as contrary
to human rights. In the context of satellite imagery, it will therefore be
important to consider the extent to which the privacy rights in the European
Convention are applicable, and whether the public interest exceptions
qualifYing those rights can be invoked by government.
The European Convention on Human Rights
The recent incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights
into domestic law may have particular significance to privacy issues
concerning satellite monitoring. The Human Rights Act 1998 will implement
Article 8 of the Convention, which concerns the right to respect for private
life.
Article 8
1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence.
2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
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national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
It is clear from Article 8 that it protects the right 'to respect for' the four
interests listed in 8(1), not the right to a private life per se. This means that
there is no general right of privacy for individuals, in the sense that they
cannot expect to be left alone by the State completely. It can be seen from
8(2) that the State must strike a fair balance between the good of the
individual and the good ofthe rest of the community. There is very little case
law of the Court of Human Rights as to what each of the interests in 8(1)
actually means. A discussion is therefore necessary of the relevant issues
which may affect satellite imagery.
Right to a Private Life under Article 8(1)
The right to respect for a person's private life, which is protected by
Article 8, is a vague concept which can be subject to different interpretations
as it is not susceptible to exhaustive definition. However, it seems from the
case law that the concept ofa private life goes beyond the restrictive confines
of the traditional British idea of privacy. The traditional British idea of
privacy tends to be more concerned with land rights, whereas the European
model seems more concerned with protecting the rights of the individual.
This can be demonstrated in the case law of the European Court. The Court
in Niemitz v Germany said,
'... it would be too restrictive to limit the notion [of private life] to an
"inner circle" in which the individual may live his own personal life as
he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not
encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also
comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop
relationships with other human beings. '7
(l992)A251-B 1992
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This expansion of the ordinary meaning of a private life suggests that
the concept of a private space may in some instances be outside the family
home. The effect of this in relation to satellite monitoring means that there
are two potential ways where a person may in principle object to their 'private
life' being violated. The first concerns activities which take place in a public
place, and the second, more recognised, violation is activities which take
place in their 'home'.
There is again very little guidance at European level, on the rights of
individuals in public places and how far Article 8 extends. It is foreseeable
that satellite monitoring of public places such as beaches, national parks etc,
may be affected by the concept of a private life extending beyond the
traditional boundaries of the home. Although it is clear that an individual has
no exclusive rights to a private life in public places, it is less clear where the
European Court will draw its boundaries. The Court decided in Friedl v
Austria that being photographed in a public street against one's wishes would
not normally amount to an infringement of Article 88 In this case the court
held that,
'... the reason why the taking of photographs and the retention of the
photographs were not regarded as an interference could be said to be
mainly that, when the photographs were taken, the applicant was in a
public place where anyone is in principle free to take photographs and
where the taking of photographs can, in most circumstances, be
considered a trivial act which must be tolerated by others, although
some persons may indeed consider it unpleasant that someone else
should take their photograph.'
It is interesting to note that the Commission concluded by only 14 votes
to nine in this case that there was no violation as regards the taking of the
photograph. This case suggests that if the intrusion is slight and foreseeable,
then this is not a violation of Article 8. However, it is less clear whether
satellite imagery which is unforeseeable, would be thought to breach
individual rights of privacy in a public place.
One of the principal objectives of Article 8 is to protect the individuals'
(1994) A 305-B.
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right to a private life in their homes. An important issue regarding satellite
imagery is the definition of 'home' and where it might extend to - eg are
gardens or surrounding fields, owned by the individual covered? There is
again very little helpful case law on what could constitute a home, although
the Court has extended the notion of 'home' to cover some business premises.
In Niemietz v Germany, the Court decided that 'home' may extend in certain
circumstances to a professional person's office. 9 The Court found that,
'... there appears, furthermore, to be no reason of principle why this
understanding ofthe notion of"private life" should be taken to exclude
activities of a professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the
course of their working lives that the majority of people have a
significant, ifnot the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships
with the outside world. This view is supported by the fact that, as was
rightly pointed out by the Commission, it is not always possible to
distinguish clearly which of an individual's activities form part of his
professional or business life and which do not.'
The Court in the above case recognised that it would not always be
possible to draw precise distinctions, but refrained from elaborating further
any definite principle that may be followed. It seems the test might be
whether the person lives and works at his place or business; or whether the
activity that is carried out could be carried on as easily at home as at the place
of work. One of these conditions would appear to be essential for Article 8
to apply, although it is difficult to predict how the court may interpret 'home'
in the future. In relation to satellite imagery it seems that the boundaries of
where, for example, a farmer who lives in a farm house surrounded by his
fields, could be said to have a right to privacy for pictures taken of his land
are very unpredictable at present. It seems that if satellite pictures clearly
show a person's house or immediate back-garden then there may be a cause
of action under Article 8. It seems unlikely that in most circumstances an
individual could argue in the UK that satellite pictures taken of Government-
owned land, a private field or industrial premises could constitute a breach
of his private life or home. However, it seems that in certain circumstances
(1992) A 251-B.
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the court may be prepared to accept that Article 8 extends to business
premises, although the boundaries of this are uncertain at the current time.
What is reasonably certain is that it will be easier for a State to justify the
interference with Government-owned land or business premises than wholly
domestic premises.
Under the Convention, it is for the applicant to establish the fact of
interference and how it has threatened the effective enjoyment of his rights.
The first thing the courts will have to consider is the level of intrusiveness.
The obvious limits of the technology and its current capabilities concerning
resolution would be unlikely to constitute an interference as the satellite
image will not be able to isolate individuals. It seems that at the current time
the court may find that the use of satellite images would not constitute a
violation of Article 8(1) because of this. However, if the resolution of the
satellites gets any better and the ways they could be developed, then this is
more susceptible to challenge.
In Accordance with the Law
The court will have to examine next whether the measure complained
of was justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention, namely whether it was
prescribed by law. The Convention states that any act that may infringe
Article 8 should have specific statutory authorisation. It is clear that an
administrative practice, however well-adhered to, does not provide the
guarantee required by 'law'. The purpose of this is so that individuals know
with sufficient clarity where they stand. The question whether an interference
with an Article 8 right is 'in accordance with the law' has been a prominent
issue in surveillance cases. Covert surveillance is not illegal in the United
Kingdom, unless the activity is expressly forbidden by law. The Convention
states that such practices are illegal as they are not clearly formulated and
accessible to individuals to be aware of the conditions under which the
authorities are empowered to resort to secret interference with the right to
privacy. In a recent telephone tapping case, Malone v UK,lu the European
Court reversed a British court decision and decided that the UK breached
10 (1995) B 67
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Article 8 because of this. As a result of this case the British introduced the
Interception of Communications Act 1985 into national law, which now
makes it a criminal offence to carry out telephone surveillance without a
warrant.
By analogy, it seems that the use of satellites to monitor private land is
not 'in accordance with the law' as there is no specific legislation on this
matter. In relation to environmental legislation the Environment Act 1995
(EA '95), provides a comprehensive set of powers of entry and investigation
which apply to all enforcing authorities exercising pollution control functions
at central and local level. This Act allows an enforcement officer to 'take
such measurements and photographs and make such recordings as he
considers necessary for the purpose ofany examination or investigation'. II
The Act also provides for such things as warrants to enter land. The use of
satellite imagery to monitor the environment raises two important distinct
questions. Firstly, whether the powers under the Environment Act 1995 are
specific enough to apply to the use of satellites; and secondly, whether a
warrant is required to take the satellite images as the satellite will not in a
legal sense enter someone's land.
The Dow Jones case in America provides a very good example of
where these issues were raised in court], In this case Dow Jones claimed that
the aerial photographs of their factory could not be admitted as evidence as
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had not got a search warrant.
The second issue which Dow Jones argued was that the EPA had used an
inspection method that was not explicitly authorised by legislation. The judge
decided that a search warrant was not required for such activities and that a
regulatory agency did not need explicit statutory provisions to employ
methods of observation commonly available to the public at large. Whether
aerial surveillance is available to the public at large is at least questionable,
as each image currently costs many thousands of pounds to purchase and
process.
Although, the courts in other jurisdictions have come to the conclusion
that specific legislation is not required, it is arguable whether the European
11
12
s 108 (e) Environment Act 1995.
Dow Chemical Company v United States (1986) No 84 -1259.
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courts would reach the same conclusion. Although investigative powers are
provided by the EA '95, they do not specifically refer to the use of satellites.
In the United Kingdom such enforcement practices by the regulatory
authorities are now likely to be interpreted differently and may be in breach
of the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention. It would seem
beneficial for the British legislators to incorporate the use of satellite
monitoring into legislation. The need for search warrants in relation to
satellite monitoring is very unclear and will probably be decided in the courts.
It would seem advisable for guidance at European level on this subject.
The Aim of the Interference
If the Court is satisfied that the interference is in accordance with the
law, it will examine whether the legislation is justified under the legitimate
aims listed in Article 8(2). Typically, the majority of interferences with a
person's private life or home will occur in the course of the enforcement of
the ordinary criminal law. The European courts will be concerned with
whether the enforcement used under the legislation (eg search warrants) is
proportionate to the aim of the interference. The problem as regards satellite
images is that they are usually just monitoring land and are effectively only
looking for 'crimes' or signs of environmental degradation, rather than
investigating a specific offence that has been committed.
There are several examples in the United Kingdom where surveillance
has been justified to detect crime in the public interest. Legislation has been
passed to put on a statutory basis surveillance from closed circuit television
cameras13 (cctv) and speed cameras. 14 The courts have held that as a matter
of public policy these should be permitted, so that persons may go to those
in danger in cases of emergency and also to provide a means of detecting and
deterring offenders. However, these activities are restricted in that the police
have to currently seek authorisation for each cctv camera to be used in a
public place from a senior police officer who must be satisfied that no
13
14
s 163, Crimina! Justice and Public Order Act 1994.
s 20, Road Traffic Act 1988.
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unwarrantable intrusion should take place. 15 The use of covert video
surveillance in hospital units has been held to be acceptable by the courts in
cases where parents are suspected of hurting their children. 16 It seems that
some uses of surveillance are deemed more acceptable than others in
protecting public policy.
Quite how far the European courts are willing to go to include
protection of the environment as a legitimate aim is of particular relevance
to satellite monitoring. The legitimate aims under Article 8(2) include the
protection ofheaIth, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
The Court is notoriously unwilling to elaborate general statements of rights.
However, it seems that the Court is moving gradually towards expanding the
right to respect for private life to provide for an element of protection against
environmental damage or pollution. In a recent judgment the Court has
accepted that Article 8 may be interpreted as including an obligation on the
State to take positive measures to protect these rights. 17 This approach could
require States to take measures to maintain or improve environmental quality
to meet a standard compatible with respect for the right to private life.
However, it is extremely difficult to say when a State might have a right to
interfere with an individual's quality of life in favour of the improved quality
oflife of the majority. In many instances it would seem beneficial to society
at large to undertake satellite monitoring on the grounds of environmental
protection, although problems start to materialise in relation to such things
as the degree of acceptable intrusiveness.
Implications of Satellite Monitoring Without Authorisation
There was a brief discussion above on whether a warrant would be
required to undertake satellite monitoring. Closely related to this is the
question of whether evidence that is obtained 'illegally', or without statutory
authorisation, is still admissible in the British courts. In this section there will
15
16
17
Para 16, Home Office guidelines on the use of surveillance equipment (1984).
Re DH (a minor) (child abuse) (1994) 1 FLR 679, 22 BMLR 146.
Guerra v Italy (1998) Application no 11611 196n35/932.
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be a discussion on the current practices that take place for admitting evidence
without authorisation in the criminal and civil courts and how the Human
Rights Act 1998 will affect British practice when it is implemented into law.
Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that
evidence which is otherwise admissible may be excluded by the judge on the
grounds that it is unduly prejudicial or unfair. This discretion usually comes
into play in cases where the enforcement authorities' conduct in the
investigation and the way they obtained the evidence is contested. Abuse of
enforcement powers can result in evidence being acquired which would
otherwise not have been obtained. This can include things such as covert
surveillance by bugging and video-taping, as well as illegally entering
premises. It is unclear whether the purpose of s 78 is to discourage the police
from obtaining evidence in an improper manner by depriving them of the
right to use it as evidence or whether it is to protect the accused from being
deprived of his civil rights. There have been case precedents that support
both of these approaches. In R v Sang one of the appeal judges decided that
the function of a judge is to ensure that the accused has a fair trial and it is no
part of that function to exercise disciplinary powers over police or
prosecution as the defendant has available civil and disciplinary remedies."
The courts in practice normally only exercise their discretion to render
evidence inadmissible for things such as the accused being deprived of a
lawyer, or unfair methods employed in the interview room. The courts will
therefore normally allow evidence to be admitted even though the
enforcement .authorities may have obtained it in an irregular fashion. The
courts normally follow the test laid down in Kuruma Son ofKaniu v R,
'the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is
whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible
and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained... we
must firmly accept the proposition that an irregularity in obtaining
evidence does not render the evidence inadmissible."9
"
19
[1979] 2 All ER 1222.
[J 955] 1 All ER 2360.
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Therefore the general test for admissibility is relevance, and anything
that comes from a product is admissible if relevant.
The effect of this rule in relation to surveillance techniques can be seen
in the case of R v Khan. 20
In this case the Court of Appeal accepted evidence from a covert
listening device (bugging) in the accused's property, even though he argued
that this involved trespass; there was no legislation regulating such practice;
and there had been a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights. The prosecution argued that all of these circumstances were
of insufficient gravity to outweigh the fact that what they were investigating
was a type of criminal conduct ofgreat gravity - heroin smuggling. The court
agreed with the prosecution and said that although they had acted in an
uncontrolled manner the offence merited it and they had acted in accordance
with the relevant Home Office guidelines. In other cases, there may well be
more compelling considerations of invasion of privacy, but it seems that such
considerations must be weighed against the probative value of the evidence.
The problems of using satellite surveillance in environmental protection are
two-fold. Firstly, as mentioned earlier the satellites are looking for possible
breaches of the law rather than specific crimes. Secondly, environmental or
agricultural offences are not seen to be criminal in the normal sense of the
word and surveillance would seem harder to justify - although monitoring
agricultural fraud would probably be considered more acceptable as the
subsidies derive from state taxes.
Assuming satellite data might be considered to be illegally obtained
evidence (ie there was no express authorisation), this does not mean that at
present it will be inadmissible in the civil courts. In civil proceedings there is
no discretion to exclude evidence that is either obtained illegally or
improperly. In Helliwell v Piggott-Sims, the judge held that,
'... so far as civil cases are concerned, it seems to me that the judge has
no discretion. The evidence is relevant and admissible. The judge
cannot refuse it on the ground that it may have been unlawfully
obtained'. 21
20
21
[1995] QB 27. Crim LR 830
(1980) FSR 582 (CA) per Lord Denning MR
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Therefore, even though a party may object to evidence being brought
against him on the grounds that a tort had been committed, the court will still
admit it as evidence. In practice this will mean that an administrative body
enforcing clean-up costs may use satellite data to show the type and extent of
the damage, even though they did not get a warrant. The court may still order
that compensation be payable to the other party if a tort is proved, although
the court will probably be sympathetic to the administrative body who were
acting in an official capacity to clean up pollution.
The Human Rights Act 1998
It seems that the pragmatic approach of the British courts to accepting
evidence from state surveillance may be greatly affected by the Human Rights
Act 1998. Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 states that:
'a court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in
connection with a Convention right must take into account any
judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European
Court of Human Rights'
Therefore, once implemented, the Human Rights Act will also make it
unlawful for public authorities to act in a way which is incompatible with the
European Convention. Anyone who claims that a public authority has acted
unlawfully may make an application for judicial review under s 6. The effect
of this is that if someone thinks they have been the victim of intrusive
surveillance under Article 8, they may seek judicial review to stop the local
authority using the 'illegally obtained' evidence from the satellite, in the
proceedings against them. It would therefore seem quite important for the
Government to urgently consider legislating on the use of satellites in the
United Kingdom.
Also of particular relevance to the European Convention, is what the
data will show and what will be done with the data. Disclosure of personal
information about an individual other than for the direct purpose for which
it was legitimately collected, may constitute an interference with the respect
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for private life under Article 8(2). It would seem to be good practice for the
Government to implement, in advance, clear guidelines of what the satellites
will be used for and why. A similar approach is used for closed circuit
television cameras so the police can later justify the interference.
Actions under Civil Law
There is no British tort of privacy, where a defendant may bring an
action in the civil courts. However, the concept of invasion of privacy may
give rise to land-oriented actions such as trespass or nuisance.
Unsurprisingly, there have been no civil actions where a defendant has argued
that a satellite has infringed his privacy by trespassing on his land. There is
one case precedent on a civil action being brought against a company that
took aerial photographs of a defendant's land. In Lord Bernstein ofLeigh
Skyviews & General Ltd the plaintiff objected to the company trying to sell
him aerial photographs of his property and claimed for damages for trespass
and an injunction to restrain the defendants from entering his air space and
from invading his right to privacy.22 The court found that the rights of an
owner of air space above his land extended only to such height above the land
as was necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the land. The court
concluded that an aircraft that had flown several hundred feet above the
ground could not be said to cause any interference with the defendant's land
and had not therefore committed a trespass. The judge commented that,
'I can find no support in authority for the view that the landowner's
rights in the air space above his property extend to an unlimited height.
In Wandsworth Board of Works v United Telephone Co, Bowen LJ
described the maxim, usque ad coleum, as a fanciful phrase, to which
I would add that if applied literally it is a fanciful notion leading to the
absurdity of a trespass at common law being committed by a satellite
every time it passes a suburban garden. '23
22
23
[1978] QB 479.
ibid Griffiths 1.
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The defendants had a statutory defence anyway under the Civil Aviation
Act 1949 which permits aircraft to enter into air space over property. It
seems that the actual act of the satellite passing over property would not
infringe any common law rules - and it would be extremely difficult for the
plaintiff to find out whether it had passed over his property in the first place.
The plaintiffs in this case argued that it was not the plane that
committed the trespass but the taking ofthe photographs. The court held that
the taking of a photograph was not illegal under any law and could not be
constituted as interference with property. The court concluded that even if
this was unlawful the aerial photographers could still take pictures of the
defendant's property over neighbouring land. However, the court did say that
although the taking of a single photograph was not actionable, a successful
action in nuisance may be brought if 'a plaintiff was subjected to the
harassment of constant surveillance of his house from the air, accompanied
by the photographing ofhis every activity' they would give relief Therefore,
although the courts are willing to protect defendants from intrusive activities
that are on an on-going basis it seems unlikely that they will consider satellite
monitoring (as the technology is at the moment) to constitute an interference
with property rights in the majority of cases. The only argument that it is
intrusive is if someone processes the data so the picture can clearly identify
something on someone's property. It is conceivable in the future that satellites
may be used to spy on industrial competitors to try and gain advantages -
though the activity that is spied on would have to be outside of a covered
building.
Conclusion
The new major piece of legislation introduced in the United Kingdom
in 1998, may have considerable implications for privacy. The effect this
legislation might have in practice is not yet well understood - as it has not yet
been fully implemented or subject to scrutiny in the courts. Although the
European Convention has been in existence for a considerable time it is
extremely difficult to determine the merits of potential complaints as the
Court has been notoriously unwilling to expand on crucial definitions within
Article 8. However, it is conceivable that in the near future that the legislation
will be tested in the context of a complaint concerning spy satellites. This
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will probably arise from someone complaining about satellite data being used
against them in criminal proceedings. It seems more likely that it will be in
one of the other European Countries where a test case is first heard, as many
of the other Member States have traditionally treated state intervention and
privacy issues more seriously than the United Kingdom.
The biggest potential barrier for bringing a privacy action at present
appears to be establishing the interference. There has been a shift in the
concept of interference because of the essentially European-influenced
legislation which concentrates more on the individual than on traditional
British land rights. At the present time the resolution capabilities of satellites
cannot make out individuals and even images of buildings are poor - although
image quality is improving on a rapid scale. The satellite image would have
to show something quite intrusive to persuade the courts that there is a need
for legal redress. If an individual can pass this first hurdle he may have a
good cause of action. It seems that the current use of satellites by United
Kingdom regulators to monitor land-use are not in accordance with the law.
The Government would be advised to think ahead and consider regulating on
this matter or amending existing legislation to include the specific use of
satellites as an inspection method.
The current uses of satellites in the context of environmental protection
seem to be quite unobtrusive to individuals and would not be the cause of
many legal complaints. The current and potential uses of satellites make
them an important part of protecting and preserving the environment and
may be deemed justifiable on the grounds of public interest. Similarly, the
monitoring of agricultural fraud may also be justified because of the degree
of fraud taking place all over Europe, which was costing taxpayers a great
deal of money. However, the potential uses of satellite monitoring in the
future may go beyond what the public find acceptable. The British tabloid
philosophy that those with nothing to hide have nothing to fear, seems to go
too far in the context ofmass state surveillance. The fear of losing our souls
to technology set up by a totalitarian state, as suggested in Nineteen Eighty-
Four, has left a lasting impression in the half-century since it was penned,
and the concept of a private life has become more important. The
establishment of a body that considers the ethical and legal implications of
monitoring certain activities by satellite, before giving permission for them
to take place would seem sensible. Such a system currently takes place for
78
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the use of closed circuit television surveillance in public places. The
Government would be advised to consider the public acceptability of such
methods of surveillance very carefully or risk the possibility of many legal
disputes in the future.
Ray Purdy
Research Associate in Environmental Law, Environmental Policy and
Management Group, T H Huxley School, Imperial College, London.
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